LA UNIÓN DEL PUEBLO ENTERO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants.	S Case No. 5:21-cv-844-XR S [Lead Case] S	
LULAC TEXAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JOHN SCOTT, et al., Defendants.	\$ \$ \$ Case No. 1:21-cv-786-XR \$ [Consolidated Case] \$	

EXHIBIT A

1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANTONIO DIVISION		
3			
4	LA UNION DEL PUEBLO ENTERO, . ET AL, .		
5	PLAINTIFFS, . vs. DOCKET NO. 5:21-CV-844-XR		
6	GREGORY W. ABBOTT, ET AL,		
7	DEFENDANTS.		
8	DET ETINATITY.		
9			
10	TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE XAVIER RODRIGUEZ		
11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOVEMBER 16, 2021		
12			
13			
14			
15			
16	APPEARANCES: FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: SEAN MORALES DOYLE, ESQUIRE		
17	BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 120 BROADWAY		
18	SUITE 1750 NEW YORK, NY 10271		
19	INDIVITORITY INT TOZIT		
20	UZOMA NKWONTA, ESQUIRE ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP		
21	10 G STREET NE, SUITE 600 WASHINGION DC 20002		
22	ANT TOTAL DO TOOT		
23			
24			
25			

1		JENNIFER HOLMES, ESQUIRE
2		NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND INC
3		40 RECTOR STREET, FIFTH FLOOR NEW YORK NY 10006
4		
5		RYAN V. COX, ESQUIRE TEXAS CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT
6		2911 N. MAIN AVENUE
7		SAN ANTONIO TX 78212
8		WENDY J. OLSON, ESQUIRE
9		STOEL RIVES LLP 101 S. CAPITOL BLVD, SUITE 1900 BOISE ID 83702
10		BOISE ID 83/02
11		DANIEL JOSHUA FREEMAN, ESQUIRE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
12		950 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE 4CON 8.143
13		WASHINGTON DC 20530
14		
15		LIA SIFUENTES DAVIS, ESQUIRE DISABILITY RIGHTS TEXAS
16		2222 WEST BRAKER LANE AUSTIN TX 78758
17		AUSIIN IA 70730
18		
19	FOR THE DEFENDANTS:	PATRICK SWEETEN, ESQUIRE WILLIAM THOMAS THOMPSON, ESQUIRE
20		TEXAS ATTORNEY GENERAL P.O. BOX 12548
21		MC 009 AUSTIN TX 78711
22		
23		CHAD ENNIS, ESQUIRE
24		TEXAS PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDATION 901 CONGRESS AVENUE
25		AUSTIN TX 78701

ĺ	-	
1		
2	REPORTED BY: GIG	I SIMCOX, RMR, CRR ICIAL COURT REPORTER
3	UNI	TED STATES DISTRICT COURT ANTONIO, TEXAS
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

```
1
        (San Antonio, Texas; November 16, 2021, at 1:30 p.m., in
 2
    open court.)
 3
             THE COURT: With that, let's turn to the civil case.
 4
             21-844, La Union Del Pueblo versus Gregg Abbott and
5
    others.
 6
             Let's take a roll call here.
 7
             For La Union, or LUPE, who do we have?
 8
             MR. MORALES DOYLE: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
 9
             Shawn Morales Doyle from the Brennan Center for
10
    Justice on behalf of La Union Del Pueblo Entero. I have with
11
   me a number of attorneys. I'm not sure if I can run through
12
    the list, or you want to get --
13
             THE COURT: No, that's all right. One per party will
14
    do for now, and if I have to recognize anybody else who
15
    speaks, let's just try to be clear for the court reporter.
16
             The other case was LULAC. Who do we have for LULAC?
17
             MR. NKWONTA: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
18
             Uzoma Nkwonta on behalf of LULAC. And I'll also
    introduce my colleagues, Kassie Yukevich and Graham White.
19
20
             THE COURT:
                         Thank you.
21
             For Houston Justice?
22
             MS. HOLMES: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
23
             Jennifer Holmes on behalf of the Houston Justice
24
    plaintiffs, and I also have a number of colleagues joining us
25
    today.
```

```
1
             THE COURT:
                         Thank you.
 2
             For OCA-Greater Houston?
 3
             MR. COX: Hi, Judge. Ryan Cox on behalf of the
 4
    OCA-Greater Houston plaintiff group, along with several other
 5
    cocounsel as well.
 6
             THE COURT:
                         Thank you.
 7
             Mi Familia Vota?
 8
             MS. OLSON: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
 9
             Wendy Olson with Stoel Rives in Boise, for the Mi
10
   Familia Vota plaintiffs. We have several counsel -- cocounsel
11
    on the line, including Sean Lyons, who is our local counsel
12.
    from Lyons & Lyons.
13
             THE COURT:
                         Thank you.
14
             And for the State defendants?
15
             MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, Patrick Sweeten and
16
    Will Thompson on behalf of the State defendants.
17
             THE COURT:
                         Thank you.
18
             And for the United States?
19
             MR. FREEMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
20
             Dan Freeman on behalf of the United States. With me
21
    on the line are Richard Dellheim, Dana Paikowsky, Mike
22
    Stewart, and Jennifer Yun.
23
             THE COURT: Thank you.
2.4
             So I apologize for the criminal docket. I don't know
25
   how that got snuck into the calendar, but it did.
```

```
apologize for that.
 1
 2
             Let's work through some of the issues here in this
 3
    case. First, let's take care of housekeeping.
 4
             We have a motion for leave to file an amicus brief by
 5
   Donna G. Davidson. That's Docket Number 78. That's opposed
 6
   by Mi Familia Vota.
 7
             It's just an amicus brief. I'm just going to --
 8
    that's going to be granted. I'll read and consider the
 9
    arguments made in there, but the foundation for government
10
    accountability, just because of the sheer number of the
11
    lawyers I have in this, will be denied speaking time.
12
             Number 2. Motion to appear pro hac vice by Stewart
13
    Whitson. Docket Number 76. That's granted.
14
             Motion to appear pro hac vice for Chase Martin.
15
    Docket Number 77. That's granted.
16
             Motion to appear pro hac vice Stewart Whitson.
17
            Mr. Whitson, I think you wanted to pay us twice.
    I'll take your money, but that's moot. So that's denied.
18
             Next. Public Interest Legal Foundation's motion to
19
20
    intervene. Docket Number 43.
            Let me turn to you, Mr. Sweeten. What's the State of
21
22
    Texas' position on that?
23
             MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, can you read that again,
24
   please?
25
             THE COURT:
                         Yeah.
                                This is a motion to intervene
```

```
filed by the Public Interest Legal Foundation.
 1
 2
             MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, the State does not object
 3
    to the intervention.
 4
             THE COURT: So now, that's kind of interesting to me,
   because if that's your position how does Public Interest Legal
 5
 6
   Foundation have standing when you're contending that the other
    defendants don't have standing?
            MR. SWEETEN: Well, Your Honor, I'm not conceding
 8
    that they have standing or not. I'm just suggesting that the
10
    State's position is that, you know, we're not actively
11
    objecting to the request.
12
             I feel like that's up to those parties to make the
13
    case for their intervention. I'm certainly not, you know,
    suggesting that they have it or don't. We're just not
14
15
    objecting to that request.
16
             And we haven't objected to amicus requests that we've
17
    seen also.
             THE COURT: Well, that's not the same as
18
19
    intervention.
20
            MR. SWEETEN: No, that's true.
21
             THE COURT: So that's denied.
22
             Public Interest Legal Foundation, to the extent that
23
    you want to file any amicus briefs, I'll consider that
24
    whenever you decide you want to do that. But with regard to
```

intervention, the State is ably defended and they can argue

```
any positions they feel they need to arque on their own.
 1
 2
             Next. Motion to intervene by Dallas County
 3
    Republican Party and others. Docket Number 57.
 4
             What's the State of Texas' position on that,
 5
   Mr. Sweeten?
 6
                          Same position, Your Honor.
             MR. SWEETEN:
 7
             No objection.
 8
             THE COURT: Same ruling. Denied.
 9
             So again, the Dallas County Republican Party can file
10
    any amicus briefs it wishes to file in this case. But again,
11
    the State is more than ably represented and their positions
12.
    are ably represented by the Attorney General's Office.
13
             Motion to appear pro hac vice by E. Stewart Crosland.
14
    That's denied since I denied the intervention.
15
             That was Docket 71.
16
             Docket 72. A motion to appear by Stephen Kenny.
17
    That's denied because I denied the intervention.
18
             So I think that takes care of housekeeping.
19
             Let's move to the motions to dismiss, and I quess let
20
   me start with asking a background question. And I'm not sure
21
    who wants to speak to this here from the plaintiffs' groups.
22
             Why are you opposing filing an omnibus complaint?
23
             I'll start with LUPE first.
2.4
             MR. MORALES DOYLE: Sure, Your Honor. Sean Morales
25
    again.
```

We are opposing to filing this omnibus complaint I think for a few reasons. One of them is that we don't have all the same interests or claims represented, i.e., the various plaintiffs to this case.

12.

2.4

Our complaint, for instance, is bringing not only different theories and different claims than some of the other plaintiffs' groups, but on behalf of different interests we represent a number of organizational plaintiffs in addition to an election judge and an election administrator, and so I think that we are, while our interests are aligned with all of them, we have different theories and different claims that we're bringing.

And though I can understand the potential expediency of having one omnibus complaint, there's also a whole lot of work that will go into coming up with omnibus pleadings for all these various groups and interests, and I do not believe that the resources that will go into figuring out a way to coordinate all of those pleadings actually provide — are worth the benefit that is provided by an omnibus complaint.

THE COURT: So I can't force you-all to do that. I believe you're making a mistake by doing that. And I think you're also putting a lot more work on the State by having to respond to these individual complaints, and a lot more work on the Court.

But again, technically and procedurally I can't

require this. I would highly advise you—all to reconsider that position in the future because this doesn't make much sense to me. But that's where we're at apparently.

So on the motion to dismiss, some of the plaintiffs have failed to allege which specific provisions of SB 1 they are complaining of. So why doesn't this failure require a dismissal and an amended complaint?

So for example, on 21-844, no specific provisions of SB 1 are cited for your Fourteenth equal protection claim, your Fifteenth Amendment right to vote claim, your Section 2 Voting Rights Act claim, your Section 208 Voting Rights Act claim, and your ADA claim.

In 21-848, there were no specific provisions of SB 1 cited regarding the Fifteenth Amendment right to vote claim.

In 21-920, no specific provisions of SB 1 are cited regarding the First and Fourteenth Amendment right to vote claims, the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims, the Fifteenth Amendment right to vote claims, and the Section 2 Voting Rights Act claim.

So why shouldn't I grant the motion to dismiss regarding those failures and require an amended complaint?

MR. MORALES DOYLE: Your Honor, I think we did specify the provisions of SB 1, but I understand you may be saying that in the actual language of the count it is not made

clear. I think that in our response to the motions to dismiss it will be — we will make very clear which of the provisions we are challenging and each of our theories.

I think in the body of the facts of the complaint we tried to make that clear. I apologize if in the language of the count itself we haven't done — again, specified each of those things.

We will address that in our response to the motions to dismiss. And I don't think filing an amended pleading is the best way to handle that.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure responding to your motion to dismiss is going to necessarily cure that.

I was hoping in the initial order that I sent out — I was trying to avoid the motions fights that I knew was coming, and so I tried to advise you—all to limit the burden on you—all, the burden on the State, and the burden on the Court on having to litigate over items that we shouldn't have to litigate. And so I'm real disappointed my advice was not taken.

I'll, of course, wait for your response on that, but I can — I'm already warning you guys. I don't see how if it's not in the complaint in the body of the causes of action how doing a response is going to cure that.

So be forewarned. If you don't file an amended complaint, you sort of know which way this is headed.

So regarding those plaintiffs alleging a violation of the ADA, these entity plaintiffs haven't specifically alleged what disabilities the members have, or how the disability limits any major life activity. Doesn't this require an amended complaint?

Who wants to tackle that one from the plaintiffs' group? Whoever has got the ADA claims.

Don't everybody speak at once.

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

MS. DAVIS: Your Honor, this is Lia Sifuentes Davis with the OCA plaintiffs.

We have included ADA claims in our pleadings, and at this stage of the pleading we just have an organizational plaintiff. And our motions to dismiss will address how the organizational plaintiff has standing to bring these claims.

THE COURT: Yeah. Again, just you-all can waste time drafting responses to motions to dismiss, but I don't think you-all are hearing me. So you know, it's a whole lot easier just to forego the response to dismiss and file an amended complaint to cure these deficiencies, but, you know, you-all do what you think is best.

The State is arguing that all claims are barred by sovereign immunity and so what exception is going to apply? And here, with regard to the State defendants, the Governor, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General, and I guess I'm more curious about the claims against the Governor.

For those plaintiff groups who have claims against 1 2 the Governor, how does the Governor have any enforcement authority in this legislation? 3 4 I'll start with LUPE. 5 MR. MORALES DOYLE: Thank you, Your Honor. 6 I'm trying to make sure I give my colleagues an 7 opportunity as well here. We think that the Governor plays a practical role in 8 the enforcement of the election code in reality, but we 10 understand the argument that the State is making with regard 11 to the way that the ex-parte en doctrine has been interpreted 12. in the Fifth Circuit and we are taking seriously those 13 arguments, but we do think that the -- and contemplating, as 14 we are with all these things, that the possibility of whether 15 an amended complaint would make sense, or whether adjusting 16 our claims makes sense, but I do want to say that we do 17 believe that the Governor in the State of Texas, as a

But I don't mean to speak on behalf of any of the plaintiff groups besides the LUPE group.

practical matter, does play a role in both shaking hand and

enforcing the election code, whether or not that is made clear

in every instance in the language of the election code itself.

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

THE COURT: So I'm not making any rulings, but in light of the Fifth Circuit's requirements about how I'm supposed to look at the Governor's role in enforcement on a

- specific provision by provision basis, this is not a ruling, but I don't see it, and so you-all might as well start looking at doing amended complaints here because I don't think you're qoing to pass muster.
 - Now, Mr. Sweeten, before I do all your work for you, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, I mean, how is it that you are arguing they have no enforcement? I mean, if you look at all these sections of SB 1 their names are everywhere.
 - MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, I'm going to let Mr. Thompson address the motion to dismiss, if I may.

6

7

8

10

11

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

- 12 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Will Thompson 13 for the State defendants.
 - We think that the main point referring to the Secretary of State and Attorney General that although they may have some roles in some circumstances, this is as Your Honor pointed out, a provision by provision question.
 - And so what we have in a lot of these complaints are kind of general allegations that the secretary does something with regard to SB 1, which isn't really sufficient.
 - What we need to know is what do the plaintiffs think that the secretary does with regard to each provision that's being challenged. How allegedly does the secretary cause the injury that's at issue in each claim?
- 25 And that's what we're missing in these complaints.

```
It's what we tried to confer about before we filed
1
2
   motions to dismiss. And we think that if we were to go
3
   provision by provision with more specific allegations, we
   would find out that many of the individual claims truly have
5
   no connection to the secretary and are, instead, probably, at
   best, connected to the local election codes.
7
             THE COURT: So you anticipated my question,
8
   Mr. Thompson. So if not the Governor, and not the Secretary
   of State, and not the Attorney General, well, then, who is the
10
   proper defendant in this case?
11
            MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, it's a difficult question
12
   to answer in the abstract because the Fifth Circuit requires a
13
   provision by provision and claim by claim analysis. So it is
14
   possible that the proper defendant will differ based on which
15
   claim is at issue, but for some things it will certainly be
   local election officials.
16
            THE COURT: But let me press you on the Secretary of
17
18
   State and the Attorney General. I mean, you're not arguing
19
   that they have no role whatsoever in investigation and
20
   enforcement, are you?
21
            MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, we are not saying that
22
   they have no role under SB 1 at all. They certainly have some
23
   role and I didn't mean to suggest the opposite.
```

What I am saying is that we can't really analyze

whether they're a proper defendant for any case under SB 1.

24

2.4

It really just depends on what injury is at issue. And for some of these plaintiffs at the very least we don't think it's met.

It's not clear whether it's met with regard to any of them because the plaintiffs haven't met their burden of specific allegations about what conduct from the defendants they are complaining of.

THE COURT: Again, I'm not making any rulings here but this ought to be clear signals to all the plaintiff groups, you need to further amend your complaints here to address these challenges because otherwise you're just wasting everybody's time with responses to motions to dismiss, making me rule on the motions, in all likelihood giving you adverse rulings, and then forcing you to amend.

I don't understand why we just can't go to amending now. This makes no sense to me whatsoever.

Okay. Now, with regard to what the plaintiffs are alleging, I want to understand this. Are plaintiffs asserting only organizational standing, or are any plaintiffs asserting associational standing?

Is there any plaintiff asserting associational standing? Please speak up now or forever hold your peace.

MR. COX: Judge, for the OCA plaintiffs all of our individual clients allege both associational and organizational standing. All five.

```
1
             THE COURT: Okay. The OCA.
 2
             Anyone else besides OCA?
 3
             MR. NKWONTA: Your Honor --
 4
             MS. HOLMES: Your Honor, the Houston Justice
 5
    plaintiffs, two of our clients, the Delta Sigma Theta Sorority
 6
    and The Arc of Texas are asserting associational standing.
 7
             THE COURT: Remind me again who the frat/sorority
 8
    group is.
 9
             MS. HOLMES: The Delta Sigma Theta Sorority.
10
                         Thank you.
             THE COURT:
11
             I'm sorry. I cut someone else off.
12.
             MR. NKWONTA: Your Honor, for the LULAC plaintiffs,
13
    three of our organizational plaintiffs are asserting
14
    associational standing. That would be LULAC Texas, the Texas
15
    Alliance for Retired Americans, and Texas AFT.
16
             THE COURT:
                         Thank you.
17
             Anyone else?
18
             MR. MORALES DOYLE: Yes, Your Honor.
19
             On behalf of LUPE plaintiffs, a number of our members
20
    -- or a number of our plaintiffs are members of organizations
21
    asserting associational standing, but not all of them.
22
             And one of our plaintiff organizations, Texas Impact,
23
    is, in fact, an organization of other organizations, and so in
2.4
    some sense its members may be a little bit more complicated,
25
    in other words, Your Honor, but we are alleging both
```

associational and organizational standing.

12.

THE COURT: So did I cut off anybody? Anybody else?

Okay. So for all those groups who are asserting associational standing, I haven't seen where you are identifying specific members of those associations who would themselves have standing to sue.

Again, on the amended complaint here, that I hope is forthcoming, or amended complaints, plural, you-all need to flush that out because I don't see where many of you have articulated those individuals sufficient to withstand any challenge.

Next one. Regarding WCVI and ADL. I'm unsure by reading the complaints currently how these organizations establish an injury.

MR. MORALES DOYLE: I just want to make sure I got it right. ADL, and what was the other group you named, Your Honor?

THE COURT: WCVI.

MR. MORALES DOYLE: Yes. Okay. Those are not — I want to make sure I'm getting our groups correct here, but those are not groups for which we are making associational standing claims. We are making organizational standing claims in terms of diversion of resources and the impact on the mission of those organizations to do their work to educate and engage voters in Texas.

1 THE COURT: So let me stop you there, Mr. Morales. 2 So there I thought you argued -- check me on the 3 complaint language, because my notes may very well be wrong -4 but I thought you said those entities were really research 5 organizations. 6 And so when you said "research organizations," I 7 thought, well, I mean, how is their research being -- how are they being injured in their research capacities? But when you 8 file these amended complaints, which again I hope are 10 forthcoming, I hope you articulate with more clarity how 11 there's injury to those two organizations. 12. MR. MORALES DOYLE: Understood, Your Honor. 13 I will just say I don't think that ADL is primarily a research organization. WCVI is, in part, a research 14 15 organization. But I think both of these organizations are -- do 16 17 certain educational functions and work with constituent and 18 community members, and that is where the standing comes from. 19 But I understand your point about the specificity of 20 allegations there. 21 Thank you. THE COURT: 22 So now, Mr. Sweeten, the organizational standing. 23 Is the State arguing on association -- pardon me. 2.4 just said it wrong. On organizational standing, haven't the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged injuries to establish

```
1
    organizational standing? Why is that deficient there?
 2
             MR. SWEETEN: Mr. Thompson will address that.
 3
             THE COURT: You're ducking all the hard questions to
 4
   Mr. Thompson.
 5
            MR. SWEETEN: I am, Your Honor. I've got a really
 6
    good help here today, so I know to lean on it when I need it.
 7
             Thank you.
 8
             THE COURT: Mr. Thompson.
 9
            MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
10
             We do think that the organizational standing
11
    allegations are deficient. One large reason, I think, cuts
12
    across many of the plaintiffs groups is that they want a
13
    diversion of resources theory.
            A diversion of resources can be a sufficient injury
14
15
   but it is not a sufficient injury in and of itself. It has to
16
   be a diversion that is used to avoid some other underlying
17
    injury in fact.
18
             THE COURT: So, I mean, have you read OCA-Greater
   Houston, Fifth Circuit, 2017, 867 F.3d, 604?
19
20
             MR. THOMPSON: It's been probably a few weeks, but
21
    I've read it, Your Honor.
22
             THE COURT: Yeah, because you didn't cite it when you
23
   were briefing your standing.
2.4
             MR. THOMPSON: I don't think that this issue was
25
    raised properly in OCA-Greater Houston. The Court decided a
```

12.

```
number of things in that case without kind of briefing on the
topic, and our position would be that the Court did not fully
consider and therefore did not rule upon, by virtue of stare
decisis, a number of issues that we've raised.
```

THE COURT: Well, I'm bound — whether you think the Fifth Circuit was well-informed or not, I'm bound by what they said.

MR. THOMPSON: I think that's almost right, Your Honor. When an issue is not briefed before the Court, we therefore often don't understand the court to be implicitly deciding it.

If the court had said, you know, "Despite the lack of briefing, we have independently researched the question and concluded the following," that would be one thing. We think we're not in that situation, Your Honor.

I suppose we could read *OCA-Greater Houston* to create a circuit split, but as a general rule we try to avoid reading Fifth Circuit precedent to split with the D.C. Circuit and things like that.

THE COURT: So I'm trying to get this case to the merits. So how do you think the plaintiffs, in their amended complaint, fix the deficiencies for the injury?

MR. THOMPSON: Sure, Your Honor.

I think what we need are allegations that explain what this law does to them in the absence of a diversion of

resources. Does it injure them as groups in some way that they then try to avoid through the diversion of resources.

I'll give an example, Your Honor. If, for example, a plaintiff in a hypothetical case said, you know, what I like to do on the weekend is I hand out pamphlets. And, you know, the city government has enacted some kind of ordinance that requires me to go get a license in order to hand out pamphlets, and if I don't get the license I'll be prosecuted.

Well, what that individual could do is allege that either he has paid the fee to get the license, and that is an injury in fact, that caused an injury or he would have broken the law, or that he's not going to pay the fee and he faces a threat of prosecution for trying to hand out pamphlets without a license.

So kind of flip side to the same point. You're either injured because when you don't comply the law is going to do something to you, or you incur some kind of cost to avoid that underlying injury.

That's not what we have here. What we have here are a lot of organizations that seem to be relying on kind of general allegations that they don't like the consequences of this law for third parties. And because they don't like the social consequences, the alleged social consequences of the law, they spend money to try and change those consequences. I don't think that's a sufficient injury in fact.

THE COURT: So all the plaintiffs have heard that, whether you want to try to amend in light of that. I'm not saying you have to, but again, I'm trying to get us to the merits without more motion to dismiss diversions.

And so if you want to rely just on your existing allegations, that may or may not meet the Fifth Circuit. I'll hear the State's — or I'll see whether or not the State's arguments about how the Fifth Circuit was not well—informed, but this is easily curable by you—all just adding more sentences to your amended complaint is what I'm trying to emphasize.

Next one. In the motion to dismiss the defense are asserting that there's no private cause of action under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

So I'm assuming this is another hard one for Mr. Thompson?

MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, anything on the motions to dismiss is Mr. Thompson today. Thank you.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Thompson, so in Shelby County the chief justice talked about injunctive relief is available in appropriate places to block voting laws from going into effect. And the chief justice said both the federal government and individuals have sued to enforce Section 2.

It sure appears that the chief justice believes there's a private cause of action.

```
1
            MR. THOMPSON: I have to respectfully disagree, Your
 2
           I think the chief justice was actually very careful to
 3
    say that they "have" sued, not that it was "proper" for them
 4
    to have sued.
 5
            Just a few months ago Justice Gorsuch flagged --
 6
             THE COURT: We're not talking about Justice Gorsuch
 7
    and his — that's all — we're not going there.
             We're talking about what a majority opinion held.
 8
 9
            MR. THOMPSON: Well, then, Your Honor, I'll point out
10
    that in the majority opinion from the Supreme Court they have
    consistently said things like, "We assume without deciding
11
   that Section 2 creates a private cause of action," which they
12
13
    are able to do because it's not a jurisdictional requirement.
14
             There is no holding from the majority of the United
15
    States Supreme Court saying that there is, in fact, a private
16
    cause of action under Section 2.
17
             THE COURT: I disagree. That part of the motion to
18
    dismiss is denied.
19
             With regard to defendants asserting there's no
20
   private cause of action under Section 208 of the Voting Rights
   Act. So, Mr. Thompson, 52 U.S.C., Section 10302 says,
21
22
    "Whenever the Attorney General or an aggrieved person
23
    institutes a proceeding," so how is there no private cause of
2.4
    action?
25
             MR. THOMPSON:
                            Sure.
```

2.4

The provision Your Honor quoted does not actually
create a cause of action. It recognizes that causes of
actions exist under other sources of law. It is of course not
limited to Section 2 or Section 208.

So we believe that it refers to, for example, 1983 suits regarding constitutional claims, but certainly included within that even we if sought VRA claims were themselves included in that provision, it would presumably be the implied cause of action under Section 5 of the Supreme Court recognizing Allen. That was the explanation that Justice Thomas gave in Morris.

THE COURT: That part of the motion to dismiss is denied. The statute is clear about an aggrieved person is able to institute a proceeding.

Next one. No private cause of action under the materiality provision of the Civil Rights Act. So now that the United States has joined this case, does this make this issue all moot or not?

MR. THOMPSON: I don't think so, Your Honor. It may reduce its practical import. We will of course address the United States' claims in our pleadings regarding their claim which has not yet been filed.

But it is certainly true that if, for example, Your Honor held that the United States had the cause of action but the private plaintiffs do not, it would then be improper to

```
1
    grant any relief to the private plaintiffs. They wouldn't be
 2.
   prevailing parties that represent attorneys fees. They are
    not going to affect this kind of ruling even if the Court is
    able to reach the merits under a different party's claim.
 5
             THE COURT: So, well then, OCA plaintiffs, I mean, do
 6
    you want to amend your complaint and drop this or not?
 7
    government is saying even if the United States is successful
 8
    then you're getting zero.
 9
             MR. COX: It may have that kind of practical impact,
10
   but I think to get the relief of our client, that our clients
11
    are seeking, we plan to continue to seek that relief and we
12
   believe that there is a private cause of -- private right of
13
    action under 208 generally and we'll be -- expect to be
14
   briefing that for the Court on Thursday.
15
             THE COURT: Okay. I won't make any ruling on that.
16
             Where are we at?
17
             Help me understand this. In your motion to dismiss
18
    LUPE's complaint, the defendants seem to assert that SB --
19
    well, I can't even make your argument. I don't seem to
20
   understand it.
21
             What are you arguing with regard to LUPE's complaint
    and the Supremacy Clause?
22
23
             MR. MORALES DOYLE: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
24
             I'm trying to refresh my recollection. I believe
   you're referring to Count 10 of the complaint, and we said
```

12.

how else to put it.

that Count 10 is redundant and therefore should be dismissed or stricken because Count 10 just says that SB 1 violates the Supremacy Clause. That's not really a claim. I'm not sure

The Supremacy Clause is a rule of decision for when there is a conflict of federal and state law. So if the plaintiffs had established some other violation of federal law, then the Supremacy Clause would tell us that federal law trumps state law. But there is no independent cause of action that says you have somehow violated the Supremacy Clause standing alone.

THE COURT: Okay. Now I understand it.

So again, in the amended complaints that are coming down you may want to clear that language up as to whether or not you are trying to assert an independent cause of action, or are you just throwing surplusage in there about the Supremacy Clause.

Okay. Let's try to figure out now where do we go forward on discovery, a scheduling order, and a trial date.

So you-all were good enough to send me the initial disclosures this morning. My law clerks quickly tabulated this. The plaintiffs have identified 165 individuals. And the defendants have identified 132. That's ridiculous.

So what appears to have happened is that I think one or both sides, or I quess there's multiple sides here, some of

you included like every member of the Texas legislature who voted in favor of SB 1, is what it looks like.

12.

Now, we all know most of these legislators didn't have anything to do with the drafting. They probably didn't even know what they were voting on, except what they were told by leadership to vote on. A lot of them probably didn't even read it. So how they become persons with knowledge of relevant facts perplexes me.

Mr. Thompson, since you get all the hard questions, how do you respond?

MR. THOMPSON: I'll be happy to respond, Your Honor.

I think I can safely say on behalf of all the parties that we didn't mean to suggest all of those people would be witnesses or anything like that.

Under the Supreme Court's latest opinion in *Brnovich* which addressed an intentional discrimination claim and Voting Rights Act, it rejected the Cat's Paw Theory, which Your Honor may be familiar with from employment cases for determining kind of the intent of the legislature.

And so at least from my personal perspective, I think what we were trying to say there is to the extent there are intentional discrimination claims one can't just establish it by the alleged intent of a bill sponsor or a leader, or something like that.

THE COURT: So we need to get reasonable about how

```
many people need to be deposed. So you-all are to file
amended initial disclosures and clearly delineate the Tier 1,
Tier 2 individuals, for lack of a better phrase, and Tier 2
being just mere legislators who voted who didn't have anything
to do with the drafting of this bill or any amendments, or
anything like that.
```

And so those people need to be listed, if you want to list them, as a Tier 2 group so we have a better understanding of who the Tier 1 group is, because by listing everybody, and I'm not saying anybody is doing this, but somebody could be hiding a person with great knowledge of relevant facts in this laundry list of 165 or 132. So we'll have none of that.

So let's file amended initial disclosures within ten days. Exchange with each other. And then I want to see also, so file those with the court. And so —

MR. ENNIS: Your Honor, may I add one thing on that? This is Chad Ennis for Medina County.

Another thing, your clerks may have missed it in the big pile of initial disclosures they received, but there are several designations for things like "All of the witnesses that testified at the hearings for these bills."

And that is literally hundreds of people without any designation of who they are. You know, if there are specific people who testified that they are interested in calling as witnesses, I think they should just identify the people. And

1 we'd ask that that go into the exchange in ten days as well. 2 THE COURT: So, thank you, Mr. Ennis. 3 So let's figure out for Rule 26(a) (1) disclosure 4 purposes the mere public speakers who attempted or did 5 actually speak at any committee hearings for this legislation, 6 to the extent that they are aggrieved individuals, or 7 individuals injured by any, and who are claiming to be part of the associational standing, I could see where those have knowledge of relevant facts. So Mr. Ennis raises a good point. Asterisk who those 10 11 people are. But, yeah, a broad designation like that is let's even put those like into the third tier group. Put Tier 12 13 1 — Tier 1, what I'm really interested in, is who really needs to be deposed first, because we're going to have to 14 15 phase discovery here, given the large amount of folks at issue 16 here. 17 And so if — to the extent you are relying on some 18 broad categories like that, let's put names and then better 19 descriptors as Mr. Ennis is suggesting. 20 Anybody else with a good suggestion on that? MR. MORALES DOYLE: Your Honor, I would just - this 21 22 is Sean Morales Doyle on behalf of LUPE plaintiffs. 23 I would just say that we did not make a broad 24 disclosure like that, but that there are, we believe, folks 25 who offered testimony in committee hearings on Senate Bill 1

```
1
    outside of our clients and folks who would be aggrieved by the
 2
    law that have relevant information, especially to the extent
 3
    that the legislators, who are proponents of Senate Bill 1
    relied upon or cited to facts that were put to them by folks
 5
    in committee hearings in justifying their passage of this
 6
   bill.
 7
             I think -- so I just want to say that I don't
 8
    think - I think that there are folks who testified at those
    hearings who have information relevant to the claims in our
10
    case outside of the type of information that you mentioned
11
    there.
12
             THE COURT: And that's fair. And so those are -- you
13
    know, properly should be disclosed as 26(a)(1), but let's at
14
    least put some descriptors here so we know who we are talking
15
    about and what they said and where they said it, so we all
16
    know why they are there.
17
             Okay. Now --
             MS. OLSON: Your Honor, this is Wendy Olson on behalf
18
19
    of Mi Familia Vota plaintiffs.
20
             Your direction was to do this in ten days.
                                                         I'm
21
    wondering if we could have until that Monday, November 29th,
22
   because ten days is Friday, the 26th, which is the day after
23
    Thanksgiving and I know people have travel plans, but I would
2.4
    just make that request.
```

That's fair. The 29th it is.

25

THE COURT:

1 Okay. With that said, I guess I was initially under 2 the impression that we were going to be under a much more 3 expedited schedule, but it seems that the plaintiffs are going 4 to want to have the March primary come and go with no injunctive relief requested from this Court. 5 6 Am I correct in that understanding? 7 MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, this is Patrick Sweeten 8 with the State defendants. 9 I want to just say that that was an assumption upon 10 which this schedule that we outlined, which I think is a 11 compressed final trial schedule that we based it on, and we 12. had discussions both — we had two discussions I believe with 13 all of the plaintiffs and they said as much. 14 And we had a discussion with the Department of 15 Justice and they indicated it was not their intention to bring 16 forward a preliminary injunction. 17 So, you know, the negotiations that took place back 18 and forth on those issues are predicated upon that assumption. 19 So I think I can answer that for the group because that's 20 certainly what we were told and what we affirmed. 21 THE COURT: And so that's why I want to confirm this. 22 So again, some plaintiff groups speak up. Is that 23 the understanding or not? 2.4 MR. MORALES DOYLE: On behalf of LUPE plaintiffs, it 25 is correct that we are not planning to pursue preliminary

injunctive relief prior to the March primary.

I do just want to say that it is not that we would like to see the March primary come and go without relief in this case, but for a variety of reasons we think it's important that the Court have a full trial record before it is deciding these claims, and given the time frame that we're working on in this case and the amount of evidence that we've already discussed we're going to need to be compiling, that's the decision that we've made at this point.

THE COURT: So then in terms of a scheduling order, if the plaintiff groups want to develop facts about what takes place in the March primary and what issues take place with regard to the ability of your constituents to vote, I mean, that's going to be yet another round of discovery that the State defendants are going to be entitled to discover on.

And so how is it that you see a March primary, fact discovery now on the March primary, dispositive motions being filed, and then a trial date, as you're suggesting in July. How does all that happen?

MR. MORALES DOYLE: Well, Your Honor, I think it will be a whole lot of work. I think all of us have — we have set the — we have proposed a discovery close deadline that is after the March primary in order to allow for discovery to continue, but we have also proposed an expert discovery time line that contemplates the majority of expert discovery

happening prior to that March primary in order to not have all of this happening at the very end of the case.

I think the evidence that comes out of the March primary, of course none of us knows what it's going to be at this point, but I think we also know that how — the evidence that comes out of the March primary is not going to be all the evidence in this case.

There's going to be probative on some points, certainly not on others, as primaries are, you know, different than general elections, so we are trying to build a plan that allows for a great deal of hopefully the majority of discovery to happen early in this case but also allows for the parties to take into account what does in fact happen in the first set of elections under SB 1 in March.

We understand that will make things very difficult for all of us, including Your Honor, after the March primary, but we think it is incredibly important that the final resolution of this case before Your Honor happens with enough time for any appeal and any further proceedings after the trial to be resolved in time for the November primary.

And in light of Supreme Court precedent about changes to elections in advance of an election — excuse me — the November general election, we think it is crucial that the trial happen earlier in the year so that we have time to sort everything out and come to a final resolution of this case

```
1
   before November to make sure that voters in the State of Texas
2
   have their rights protected and that it's a fair election.
3
             THE COURT: Does any other plaintiff group wish to
4
    speak in addition to the comments Mr. Morales already made?
5
             Mr. Sweeten.
6
             MR. SWEETEN: Yes, Your Honor.
7
             THE COURT: So I mean, the plaintiffs are asking me
   to do a heck of a -- and everybody, to do a heck of a lot of
8
   work in a short period of time. I'm willing to put the effort
10
    in.
11
             I mean, is there any dispositive motions you see that
12
    could be filed without the benefit of discovery that's just a
13
    strictly legal issue that at least we don't have everything
14
   having to be decided, argued, briefed, and ruled upon at the
15
   end?
16
             MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, I think so.
17
             I think there could be some motions for summary
18
    judgment.
19
             Let me address the overall schedule which is, you
20
   know, they have indicated and we have indicated to the Court,
21
    and this is the very reason why we don't agree to set a trial
22
    date on July 5th at this point, which is that we have agreed
23
   to a very truncated discovery process.
```

We think that, you know, we're going to give it our

best shot. We -- you know, if we start getting a bunch of

24

1 late disclosures of fact witnesses, you know, that could 2 change that.

I can tell you, and this is likely an issue that you're going to want to — you know, you may want to talk to us about later, but certainly my recent discussions with the DOJ have certainly brought to question, you know, whether or not we are going to be able to make this schedule go. But that's the very reason.

We are planning to — there is an awful lot of work. The first step is the motions to dismiss. And as the Court is saying, you know, get these complaints. Tell us what is the complaint. Well, what is the specific statutory problem?

They're apparently not going to agree to a uniformed complaint, which I think would really, you know, make this, you know, be a lot easier and increase the potential to meet this schedule.

But we think that, you know, we're hopeful we can meet this schedule. We do think that there will be some issues that may be subject to judgment as this goes along. But that's, you know, one of the reasons that we think that maybe we wait until, you know, we wait to set the trial date to see if we're actually going to be able to work through this schedule.

But you know, we're giving our best shot, based on their, you know, representation to us. There's not a

```
preliminary injunction, you know, proceeding. We're trying to
 1
 2.
   make this work. And I think this Court is doing -- I think
 3
   this is great — a great service.
 4
             As the Court knows in our redistricting challenges,
 5
   when you have multiple --
 6
             THE COURT: Let's not bring that up.
 7
             MR. SWEETEN: I was just thinking, it's been four
   years, I think, since I've seen you, Your Honor.
 8
 9
             Anyway, I think strictures. I think making them
10
   plead what is their claim. Tell us what that is. And then I
11
    think, you know, following the orderly process of this case.
12
            We'll attempt to, you know, give best efforts to that
13
    discovery schedule that we have laid out, but we do think that
14
    we may want to see how that's going to make a determination as
15
   to whether the trial date is - you know, when that should be
16
    set.
17
             THE COURT: Does the U.S. want to chime in on this?
18
            MR. FREEMAN: Yes, Your Honor. Dan Freeman for the
19
   United States.
20
             The United States agrees that this is an extremely
   aggressive schedule. In particular, the schedule anticipates
21
22
   that experts would be disclosed at the beginning of February.
23
             Now, we stand ready to work to meet this schedule,
   however, this schedule is only possible if the parties agree
24
25
   to participate in discovery and not engage in dilatory
```

tactics.

And Mr. Sweeten has advised the Court, and we advised the Court in our 26(f) report that we filed last night, that the United States has already issued a request for production to the State. The State informed us at our 26(f) conference that it did not intend to produce any documents in response to that request or database extracts as the case may be.

But they at the same time refused to stipulate to an early written formal response to that request and would allow the United States to get them out of the court and to bring a motion to compel.

And those type of delays are going to prevent the parties from being able to meet the schedule and are going to prevent the parties from being able to vindicate the rights of Texas voters, as Mr. Morales Doyle represented before.

We believe this is a separate issue that is best addressed at the — toward the conclusion of this pretrial conference, but I'm happy to address it now.

MR. SWEETEN: Well, Your Honor, if the DOJ is going to accuse me of dilatory tactics, I'd like to address that right now. May I, Your Honor?

THE COURT: No. One sec.

I think most people on the screen know me. I don't want to dwell on fights. I want to move the thing forward.

So I know you don't like the moniker, and I would

```
1
   take offense if someone said that to me too, but let's just
 2.
   move forward.
             So just like I'm trying to tell the plaintiffs, file
 3
 4
    an amended complaint, and I'm telling them, and I'm telling
    everybody, file amended 26(a)(1) disclosures, motions to
 5
 6
    compel, none of us have time to fight over motions to compel.
 7
            Now, if the government is going to assert — the
 8
    government — the State defendants are going to assert
    legislative privilege or some other privilege, let's talk
10
   privilege logs. Have you-all talked about how you're going to
11
    do a privilege log?
12
             MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, to my knowledge, there's
13
    been no discussion about a privilege log with any of the
14
   parties, that I know of.
15
             THE COURT: Is that the basis of where you think
16
    you're not going to be able to cooperate on the U.S.'s request
17
    for documents? Is that --
18
            MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, I thought you didn't want
19
   me to address that, but I think I need to because counsel, you
20
    know, seems to be indicating that we're saying, "We're not
    giving you any documents." That's not what we're saying.
21
22
             What happened, Your Honor, is that on
23
   November 4th the DOJ filed a lawsuit. We received last Friday
```

a request, not for just documents, we received a request for

an entire database from the DPS, which has 29 million people

24

1 that are on there. They also asked for the -2 THE COURT: One second. 3 The DPS, Texas Department of Public Safety? 4 MR. SWEETEN: Yeah. They asked for the entirety --5 well, I shouldn't say the entirety. They asked for a number 6 of data fields from DPS. They asked for the 17 million entry TEAM's database from SOS. 8 They have asked for two databases because -- and we're still -- we're going to have a lot of discussions about 10 this with opposing counsel because this is a breathtaking 11 request. The only time in the history of DPS that they have 12 given this up was when Mr. Freeman and DOJ sued us under 13 Section 5, which would have been the spring of 2012, and then 14 the carryover litigation was the Section 2 litigation. 15 So what we're going to address, Mr. Freeman's 16 request, which he sent last Friday, we've basically had all 17 of -- you know, it was Friday evening. We've had all of two 18 business days. We've been trying to get information about those 19 20 databases but it is a sweeping request made in the eleventh --21 you know, after we have had multiple discussions with these 22 plaintiffs to get a large amount of data, including data from 23 senators, you know, politicians, federal judges, state judges. 24 That's all on the DPS voter databases.

So we have got a lot of issues to work through, but

```
1
    this was sprung upon us in a call last week when he said,
 2
    "We're going to ask for the databases." And I said "No."
 3
             And, you know, we're looking and evaluating the
 4
    request that we got on Friday. It is going to take experts
5
    from both of those agencies to come in and explain what would
   be, you know, possible, what would be, you know, a really hard
 7
    lift, but that by itself, asking for database extracts, which
   has a long process, which I can go through --
 8
 9
             THE COURT: No. That's okay. One second. One
10
    second.
11
             So let me go back to the United States. What's the
12.
    relevance of the data?
13
             MR. FREEMAN: Sure, Your Honor.
14
             SB 1 requires individuals who wish to cast a mail
15
   ballot to list their identification number on their mail
16
    ballot request, as well as their mail ballot carrier envelope.
17
            And SB 1 requires that early voting clerks shall
18
    reject any mail ballot application that doesn't include an
19
    identification number, if that individual has been issued an
20
    identification number that does not identify the same voter
21
    identified in the applicant's application for voter
22
    registration.
23
             Now, the problem with this is that TEAM does not
24
    necessarily contain every voter's up-to-date driver's license
```

25

number.

There are voters who -

1 THE COURT: Let's —

12.

2.4

MR. FREEMAN: TEAM. Excuse me, Your Honor. TEAM is the state's voter registration database.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. FREEMAN: Now, the problem, Your Honor, is that in some cases the voter may have registered to vote soon after moving to Texas while they still had an out-of-state driver's license and listed a social security number on their voter registration application.

They then obtain a Texas driver's license. They list their Texas driver's license number on their mail ballot application as instructed, and then their application for a mail ballot will be rejected because it doesn't match what was on their voter registration application.

Now, what the United States seeks to — and that rejection violates Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the materiality provision.

Now, what the United States intends to do is quite similar to what the United States did in *Texas v Holder* when the State of Texas sued the United States under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and in *Veasey v Abbott*, where United States, among several private plaintiff groups sued the State under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

The State has produced these database extracts twice before, in terms of DPS. In terms of voter registration

12.

database, the State has produced that database to the United States previously outside of litigation, as it's subject to production upon demand by the Attorney General under Title 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The State has also produced voter registration database to the United States in both of those cases.

Experts are then able to compare those two databases to determine where there are voters on the voter registration database who do not have their proper driver's license listed.

It is my understanding that there are also voters in the DPS databases who have multiple driver's license numbers listed, because it's possible to have an identification card and a driver's license over the course of your life. They will not know which one of those numbers is in the voter registration database and will be disenfranchised as a result.

It is possible that individuals who have surrendered their driver's license and no longer have that document to be able to provide that number as SB 1 requires, and they will be disenfranchised as a result.

And so the United States is asking the State to do exactly what it did twice before in litigation, once where it sued the United States, and once where the United States sued the State. Both times where the State enacted legislation that put these driver's license numbers at issue in a restriction on the right to vote.

THE COURT: So let me suggest this here.

Let me — can the government achieve what it's attempting to achieve by merely sending out requests for admission, asking the State to admit that there are these following discrepancies that you just identified, and then sending out an interrogatory by asking them to identify how many times these kind of occurrences have occurred?

And then in the event that they refuse to do so or claim it's unduly burdensome or whatever, then you come back and asking to do — to get the databases and do the work yourself.

Go ahead.

12.

MR. FREEMAN: Your Honor, I'm not certain that the State would be willing or able to conduct this analysis with the sort of degree of accuracy and expertise that the experts that the United States has retained have been able to do in the past.

Courts have relied on experts retained by the United States when conducting this sort of match during a Veasey litigation, a voter right litigation. The State opposed an alternative algorithm for matching the voter file to DPS files. The State ultimately abandoned that algorithm, as it determined — well, I won't speak for the State.

The State abandoned the algorithm that it had proposed, and the United States, and ultimately the court

1 moved forward with the analysis that the United States was 2 able to provide.

12.

The various claims that the State has made about the burden of this production, in fact, the State has done this before. The code has been written before.

I personally at the State's request flew down to

Texas to pick up a copy of the database extract in the Texas v

Holder litigation so that we could address security concerns

the State had. The United States is happy to agree to the

same types of protective orders to address the State's

concerns.

We see this as critical to the United States' claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and we believe that the State's immediate assertion, the burden of the request outweighs the benefit.

One, it's contrary to the spirit of Rule 26, and the committee notes to the 2015 amendment specifically said that these type of default assertions — I mean, immediate assertions that no discovery in response to a particular request is possible because of the burden should not be allowed.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FREEMAN: And we're not asking the State to produce immediately. We're simply asking them to allow us to tee this up.

1 THE COURT: Thank you.

So at this point there's not a motion to compel before me to rule on. You-all continue to meet and confer.

I will say this, Mr. Sweeten, in light of the representations that are being made that this has happened before, any arguments of unduly burdensomeness, you're going to have a steep hill to climb to overcome that, but I'm not making any rulings.

And so, again, to the extent that you can enter into protective orders to protect the sensitivity of this information, but again this is premature for me to make any rulings. I'm not making any rulings.

MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, let me just say. I won't arque the motion because I hear the Court.

I agree. I think right now what's happening is this issue, we're jumping the gun on this. We will have discussions with DOJ regarding this issue. I wanted to raise these concerns to the extent that they impact scheduling.

But, you know, we also just — I want the Court to know that there is going to be a lot of interfacing with our team and experts at both of these agencies about, you know — about these issues, and these things take time.

So we will address their discovery requests. We'll be happy to talk to DOJ about this. But overall, I think, you know, I think this is something we can deal with as this goes

```
along, but I wanted to flag this issue to the Court.
 1
 2
             THE COURT: No, thank you.
 3
             So now, we still -- we walked away from privilege.
 4
             To the extent that the State is not -- is going to
5
    claim privilege to any documents, I want a privilege log. And
 6
    so it's going to have to articulate clearly the authors,
 7
    author, or authors, plural, the recipient, or recipients,
 8
   plural.
 9
             And if the author or the recipient wasn't a
    legislative — a legislator, or a legislative aid, it seems
10
11
    highly improbable that you can in good faith articulate
12
    legislative privilege in those kind of scenarios.
13
             To the extent that you think you can in good faith
    articulate legislative privilege, I want a log, and the Bates
14
15
    stamp, and I will review, in camera if need be, any documents
16
    subject to any privilege.
17
             Okay. We've covered a lot today. Hopefully we're
18
    going to move things along. I'll be very disappointed if I
19
    don't get amended complaints, folks. I don't know how to make
20
    that point anymore clear.
21
             MR. MORALES DOYLE: Your Honor.
22
             THE COURT:
                        Yes.
            MR. MORALES DOYLE: I do not want to necessarily
23
24
    represent that I'm speaking on behalf of all the plaintiffs
25
    here, although I think I may be. We hear you. We are dealing
```

1 right now with a response deadline on the motions to dismiss 2. of this Thursday. 3 And so --4 THE COURT: That deadline is extended for 15 days. 5 Hopefully that deadline will never be met and we see 6 amended complaints well before that. 7 MR. MORALES DOYLE: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, may I get a reciprocal 9 extension on any replies? 10 THE COURT: Yes. MR. SWEETEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 12. I do think there was one issue that I don't know that 13 we addressed to the Court, and that is the order with the 14 deposition limitations. I don't know if the Court wants to 15 entertain that at this point. THE COURT: Let me backtrack here because I didn't 16 17 finish off on trial now. What I'm contemplating is setting the trial date for 18 July right now, just so for purposes of my calendaring I can 19 20 hold something as a placeholder that we can all try to aspire 21 to. 22 But I will tell everybody that, you know, I will be 23 reasonable to all parties in the event that circumstances 2.4 don't allow us to meet that. But for a placeholder, that's 25 what I'm going to set for now.

Now, with regard to numbers of depositions, until I see the amended initial disclosures I really can't say right now what I think is an appropriate first tier of discovery depositions. So once I get the initial disclosures, the amended initial disclosures then I will set a first round of deposition — number of depositions to be had for the first tier of discovery.

MR. SWEETEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

And Your Honor, if I may just say, the one issue I think that we are — you know, we want to be — you know, alert the Court to, is the number of plaintiffs that are in this case.

There are — I think the count — it's in our filing, but there's something like 30 organizational plaintiffs and six individual plaintiffs. I think that's right.

We don't need — you know, some are making ADA claims. Some are making others. We don't need a full seven hours for those folks, but we need the number that might be necessary to take those plaintiffs.

And so that was our concern with, you know, just picking a fixed number, because I think that judicial economy, you know, can be increased by, you know, taking a shorter deposition but not being constrained by, you know, this hard number, particularly when we're faced, you know, with basically the number of plaintiffs that they are asking to

```
limit us to. So we're more for hours than limitations but we
 1
 2
    can certainly address that down the road if the Court prefers.
 3
             THE COURT: Yeah. Continue to meet and confer on
 4
    this.
 5
             I mean, I'll tell you this, plaintiff groups, I've
 6
    just completed a very difficult trial on the Sutherland
 7
    Springs mass shooting case. It was at least four dozen, five
 8
    dozen plaintiffs with at least two dozen plaintiffs'
    attorneys, and they all managed to have a unified front, and
10
    so I don't understand your reluctance to an amended complaint
11
    and you-all going forward on that basis.
12
             Mr. Morales was very articulate about why he thought
13
    that was not feasible. It sounded real great.
14
             But honestly, Mr. Morales, as I heard it, I mean, it
15
    sounded great, you delivered it great, but it really wasn't
16
    persuasive to me about why you-all can't join together.
17
             I think an amended omnibus complaint will make this
18
    case go much smoother for everyone involved. And so I highly
19
    recommend that after this call you-all try to get together and
20
    try to figure that out.
21
             MR. FREEMAN: Your Honor, may I --
22
             MR. MORALES DOYLE: Excuse me.
23
             THE COURT: Mr. Freeman.
             MR. FREEMAN: Your Honor, I was just going to ask, do
24
    you include the United States in that request, because it
```

1 would be exceedingly difficult for us to be able to confer 2 with private plaintiffs. 3 THE COURT: I see that. You have a different 4 representation to this. So I exclude the U.S. from that 5 discussion. 6 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. FREEMAN: 7 THE COURT: Who else wanted to chime in? 8 MR. COX: Judge, it also implicates the issue that we 9 do have one party, Isabel Longoria, who is both a plaintiff and a defendant in the case, and how we would manage to have a 10 11 unified omnibus complaint in that respect; I'm not sure. 12. THE COURT: Yeah. So I'm not making any rulings. I 13 can't force you to do that. You-all continue to talk among 14 yourselves and see what's best. 15 Even if you don't do an omnibus complaint, you-all 16 really need to treat this almost as an MDL. You need to have 17 one or two of your group serve as the lead lawyer to speak on 18 behalf of discovery issues and so forth. We've got to make this case more manageable, and an MDL analogy makes most sense 19 20 to me. 21 MR. MORALES DOYLE: We will absolutely discuss with one another. I want to assure you, Your Honor, that all of 22

plaintiffs' counsel have been in touch with one another. We

are not trying to make this more complicated than it needs to

be and we will discuss what you proposed.

23

2.4

```
1
             THE COURT:
                         Okay. What have I forgotten? Anybody
 2
    want to speak up?
 3
             MR. SWEETEN: Nothing from the State, Your Honor.
 4
             MR. FREEMAN:
                          Nothing from the United States, Your
 5
   Honor.
 6
             THE COURT: So I didn't give a deadline for amended
 7
    complaints.
 8
             So I guess the deadline needs to be whatever date I
 9
    gave you to file the response to motion to dismiss. So you
10
    either file a response to a motion to dismiss, or you file an
11
    amended complaint, by the --
             Did I say the 29th? Did I give you a date or not?
12.
13
    don't remember.
14
             MR. MORALES DOYLE: You said 15 days, Your Honor,
15
    which I believe would put us at December 1st. Unless that is
16
    15 days from today, or 15 days from the deadline.
             THE COURT: Let's just make this simple.
17
18
             Amended initial disclosures by everybody due by
19
    December 1.
20
             Responses to motion to dismiss or amended complaints
    due by December 1st.
21
22
             If there's responses to motions to dismiss, then the
23
    State has 14 days thereafter to file any reply briefs.
2.4
             Was that clear enough?
25
             MR. MORALES DOYLE: Yes, Your Honor.
```

1 MR. ENNIS: May I raise one more thing, from Medina 2 County? This is Chad Ennis.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ENNIS: You mentioned, and I think we got sidetracked, was, is there a way to get rid of some of these claims, or at least deal with some of these claims that are purely legal claims?

And I think it may make sense for Your Honor to order us or get us to meet and confer on are there any of these claims that present purely legal issues that we can agree that we can brief early and get them to Your Honor and get them disposed of without the need for discovery or back and forth, and really kind of focus the case.

Obviously, we think omnibus pleadings would help a ton, but if we don't get that, at least we could try to focus this down on what are factual issues that we have to fight about and how do we get this thing ready for trial in July.

THE COURT: So I already ordered you-all to do that in my first order. It was in there in the laundry list.

Meet and confers are not a one-time occasion, so they can be continuing. And so continue to meet and confer on that and all the other issues. It would benefit us all, if we're going to be in this push to July, if we can take up some strictly legal matter.

Now, Mr. Sweeten, I'm not saying your side is being

```
1
    unreasonable, but if you start arguing that, you know,
 2
    everything can be disposed of by summary judgment, well, you
 3
    know, that's not going to help me either.
 4
             And so, I mean, for example intentional
 5
    discrimination. You can't tee that up by summary judgment
    without discovery, just as an example.
 6
 7
             And so you-all continue to meet and confer to figure
 8
    out what, if any, discrete issues are solely legal issues and
    that I can take up earlier rather than later.
10
             MR. SWEETEN: Yes, Your Honor.
11
             THE COURT: Anybody else?
12.
             Okay. We'll meet again.
13
             Thank you.
14
             (Concludes proceedings.)
15
                                 -000-
16
        I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
17
    the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. I
18
    further certify that the transcript fees and format comply
19
    with those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial Conference
20
    of the United States.
21
22
   Date: 11/19/2021
                               /s/ Giqi Simcox
                               United States Court Reporter
23
                               655 East Cesar E. Chavez Boulevard
                               San Antonio TX 78206
2.4
                               Telephone: (210) 244-5037
25
```